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The New Zealand economy has been through a radical restructuring, commencing 
in 1984 and following a so-called ‘neoliberal’ philosophy of economic rationalism.  
A market-based model has been imposed on most public sector activities, 
including the provision of education, together with a new ethos of managerialism.  
As a corollary, earlier liberal notions of a minimalist state are embraced.  The fear 
is that under so-called public choice theory individuals (including bureaucrats and 
politicians) will act in their own individual self-interest rather than in some 
idealised notion of the public good1.  The dysfunctional result, it is said, will be 
‘provider capture’ by those individuals and a consequent growth in government 
and, impliedly, a diminution in efficient resource allocation. 
 
The genesis for the philosophy of ‘self governing’ schools lies in two 1988 policy 
documents – ‘Tomorrow’s Schools’2 and the Picot Report3.  Formal legislative 
implementation of the program came with the Education Act 1989.  Old 
institutional structures in education were to be replaced by ‘systems of governance 
based upon rational principles of responsibility and accountability which would be 
linked transparently to policy decisions and action’4.  The general political 
background was characterized by an embrace of free market economics and 
minimal state intervention, notwithstanding that the government of the day was 
Labour.  Education was taken to be another commodity in the marketplace.  The 
reforms have been characterized as ‘arguably the most thorough and dramatic 
transformation of a state system of compulsory education ever undertaken by an 
industrialised country’5. 
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, J.Codd ‘Educational Reform, Accountability and the Culture of Distrust’ (1999) 34 New Zealand 
Journal of Educational Studies’ #1 45 at 46-48. 
2 ‘Tomorrow’s Schools: The Reform of Education Administration in New Zealand’ (D.Lange, Minister of 
Education, August 1988). 
3 ‘Administering for Excellencea: Effective Administration in Education’ (Report of the Taskforce to Review 
Education Administration’ April 1988) (the ‘Picot Report’).  
4 D.McKenzie ‘The Clouded Trail: Ten Years of Public Education Post-Picot’ (1999) 34 New Zealand Journal of 
Educational Studies’ #1 at 8. 
5 M.Alexander ‘School reforms cause racial split’ (Christchurch) Star Times (May 21, 2000) at A6 (quoting H.Ladd, 
E.Fiske When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale (Brookings Institution Press, 2000). 
The image of the old education framework was one of rigidity, with a centralised, 
highly bureaucratised Department of Education on the one hand and powerful, 
self-interested teacher unions on the other.  Resources were said to be expended 
inefficiently and motivation tended to lie in teacher self-interest6. 
 
The new image would be characterised by flexible, localised institutions newly 
empowered and responsive to local community.  Teacher self-interest would be re-
directed by market forces toward meeting the needs of its constituent community 
and thereby to the social good generally.  The new institutional framework would 
encourage entrepreneurship and innovation in place of the old rigidity and 
bureaucracy.  Some possible channels for the newly entrepreneurial school 
included charging ‘voluntary’ fees, image shaping, nurturing corporate 
relationships, attracting foreign fee-paying students, curriculum innovation (within 
the natonal guidelines), and so on7. 
 
A centrepiece of the new philosophy was a transfer of substantial powers of 
governance and management of individual schools from the centralised Ministry of 
Education to locally elected School Boards of Trustees.  The trustees would be the 
medium through which this new responsiveness to the education marketplace 
would be realised.  The new institutional framework imposed complex, quasi-
contractual  roles and responsibilities on school boards8 and a similarly complex 
relationship with Principals.  Accountable Boards implied control over resources, 
and so a corollary of the new regime was the granting of (formula based) ‘bulk 
funding’ to boards along with discretion as to its allocation.  Salaries were of 
course the major category of expenditure and within a given total, and within given 
maximum and minimum staffing ratios, boards would have discretion as to 
numbers of teachers and the steps on the national salary scale at which they would 
be employed.  By May 1998 only 10% of boards had exercised the bulk funding 
option, so the government introduced some $222 million in financial incentives to 
attract new boards.  The mechanism involved funding teacher salaries at the top of 
the range irrespective of the individual schools’ actual salary profile – those with 
less senior staff would be favoured. The policies were resolutely opposed by 
national teacher associations9.  Interestingly, the original market model for 
education scheme was introduced by a Labour government, continued by a 
National (conservative) government, including the financial incentives to join the 
                                                 
6 See, for example, S.Robertson ‘Strip Away the Bark.  Expose the Heartwood.  Get the the Heart of the Matter: 
Re/regulating Teachers’ Labour in New Zealand’ (1999) 34 New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies #1 121 at 
124. 
7 Supra, note 6 at 126. 
8 See, for example, Note 4 at 10: ‘ BOT’s were required to learn rapidly not only how to manage school plant but 
also to hire staff, act as a good employer, and be accountable to their electorates and government authority for the 
expenditure of public money and the professional work in their schools’. 
9 See, for example, supran note 4 at 11 – teacher associations objected on grounds of adhering to national career and 
salary structures, equity between schools, and the dangers of boards opting to buy ‘cheap’ staff.  See also supra note 
6 at 126, noting also claims of risk of declining school funding, larger class sizes, competion between teachers and a 
diminution in collegiality. 
bulk funding scheme, whilst the new and current Labour government has moved to 
roll back bulk funding10.  Some one third of schools had eventually opted in to the 
bulk funding scheme11. 
 
The role of the Ministry of Education was to be narrowed to one of providing 
policy advice to government, national curriculum objectives, monitoring current 
policy and mediating rule-based resource allocation.  Presumably there were 
bureaucratic cost savings to be realised – reduced transaction costs – and impliedly 
an ability of government to distance itself from controversy in the educational 
marketplace.  An important link between local boards and the Ministry would be 
the mandatory inclusion in Board-authored school charters of benchmark National 
Educational Guidelines (NEG’s) and National Administration Guidelines (NAG’s).  
They would form a core program of outputs against which schools as providers 
could be evaluated by the newly created Education Review Office (ERO), which 
replaced the old school inspectors12.  Its reports were to be made public and a bad 
one would serve as a compliance ‘whip’ in the race of providers, since poor 
performers would face declining enrolments in the competitive marketplace and be 
allowed to fall by the wayside.  Of course ERO’s audit target was both teachers 
and boards, and its audience both the Ministry of Education and the local 
community – the former to ensure compliance with educational benchmarks and 
the latter to unleash the market forces which would be the ultimate regulator.  In 
the opinion of some a culture of trust (particularly in teachers but also in the public 
service culture of educational bureaucracy) is thus replaced by a culture of 
surveillance13. 
 
The new framework valorised ‘managerialsim’ and ‘markets’, focusing on 
measurable ‘outcomes’ (rather than resource inputs) and audits of ‘providers’, as 
opposed to (say) a more freewheeling acknowledgement of teachers’ claims to 
expertise, innovation and qualitative pedagogy – in short, their professionalism.  
The educational ‘product’ is the child’s educational ‘entitlement’, and the audit 
focuses on measurable managerial records of ‘good practice’ (such as the national 
curriculum, adherence to the NEG’s and NAG’s, formal systems and records such 
as attendance, marks, standard practices, teaching schedules, etc.).  In short, a 
notion of ‘good practice’ constructed on managerialism14 and its pseudo-scientific 
                                                 
10 The Press, April 6 2000 at 6 (Education Amendment Bill introduced April 4, 2000) – the newspaper quotes 
Opposition education spokesperson Nick Smith as stating that ‘about 890 of New Zealand’s 2700 schools chose to 
be bulk-funded’. 
11 Ibid.  See also supra note 6 at footnote 3 re early statistics – originally only 10% of schools opted in, and after 9 
months the number had grown to 17%. 
12 Note that McKenzie (supra note 4 at 14) claims that ERO in fact bears an ‘uncanny resemblance’ to the old and 
generally discredited school inspector system, and (at 15) notes disapprovingly its tendency to privilege criteria 
merely on grounds of measurability rather than intrinsic worth. This latter is a standard criticism of managerialism 
generally. 
13 See, for example, supra note 1 at 49. 
14 ‘Managerialism’ broadly connotes the attempt to apply pseudo-scientific principles, using quantitative measures, 
to achieve greater (economic) efficiency and effectiveness in attainging predefined outcomes (see for example supra 
aura.  It is assumed, or at least asserted, that this shift is an appropriate evolution 
from the previously social / cultural practices of education. 
 
Note that the professional context for teachers – including matters of discipline, 
classification, training and working hours – now lay in the hands of the new 
managers, the Board of Trustees15.  More importantly, the new institutional 
arrangements arguably suggested a ‘low trust’ view of teachers themselves, of their 
status as ‘professionals’ involved in a complex and subtle activity, as opposed to 
the old model’s implied ‘high trust’ / professional characerisation16.  Predictably, 
the potential for opportunism based on this managerial model then replaces one 
grounded in professionalism and the moral agency of the teacher – that is to say, 
teachers quickly learn the rules of the new game and shape their records and 
processes to it17, arguably at the expense of more subtle qualities (such as 
commitment, loyalty, sense of public duty, collegiality) that imbued the 
professional model18.  Obedience and conformity to the new managerial values and 
processes become sufficient in themselves19 and no further professional or moral 
responsibility is required.  Accountability is now a formal, externally imposed 
thing reflecting low trust in the professional teacher.  Note, however, that there are 
arguably important macro-economic costs to the (claimed) erosion of trust20, 
education being but a sub-set of those costs. 
 
Note that Boards, too, will learn the rules of the new game and in many cases 
confine themselves to its narrow parameters in the hope of a ‘good’ ERO report.  
They will be guided by the school principal who in turn must master and practice 
the new values and processes. Thus does the tail start to wag the dog.  That school 
boards would be ill-equipped to manage, or even be aware, of these fundamental 
changes would seem obvious.  They too will be swept up in externally imposed 
values and processes at the macro level – for example, the requirements of NEG’s 
and NAG’s, the recurring presence of ERO – and at the micro level by principals 
themselves who must become the agents of change and who control the flows of 
managerial information to the board, and who will (according to the public choice 
theory that informs the new model) be motivated by their own self-interest. 
                                                                                                                                                             
note 1 at 47 – an early example is that of Taylorist industrial management systems evolving as a counterpart of 
Fordist mass production in early twentieth century America).  
15 See supra note 6 at 123. 
16 Supra, note 6 at 128-9.  See also at 130: ‘Students are assumed to be mere empty vessels to be filled with the 
appropriate curriculum mixture, delivered via a particular pedagogy and assessed at regular intervals.  Ethnicity, 
gender and class are viewed by ERO as excuses offered by teachers to protect their own self-interest’. 
17 For example the ‘manufacture of artefacts and ritualistic displays’ to impress the ERO observer (supra note 6 at 
130).  Efficiency / effectiveness is to be measured in terms of records and reports which meet the important criterion 
of efficiency not only being done but being seen to be done (see, for example, supra note 1 at 47).  
18 See, for example, supra note 1 at 51-2. 
19 Ibid. 
20 See, for example, supra note 1at 50-51.  The argument is that trust contributes to ‘social capital’ and that it is self 
perpetuating, and conversely that distrust in turn breeds more distrust and becomes self-fulfilling.  Importantly 
(citing F. Fukuyama Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Hamish Hamilton, 1995) ‘social trust 
is critical to economic prosperity’ and the risk is that the New Zealand experiment with economic rationalism may 
ironically be eroding the very economic prosperity it seeks to invigorate. 
 
Finally, in 1991 the newly elected National government extended the reforms by 
removing zoning requirements, thus enhancing at least the illusion of an 
educational market by introducing parental choice21.  That it is an illusion is fairly 
obvious as the model takes no account of the socio-economic contexts of students 
and schools.  High profile, high status and high scoring schools will clearly be 
popular choices but unable to accept all applicants.  Choice will be exercised by 
the school / principal rather than parents and will tend to be self-perpetuating22.  
[RELATE THIS TO LATER -??- DISCUSSION OF ‘CHOICE’ VS. 
‘EQUALITY’ AS PER OLSSEN DISCUSSION PP. 67-8…note that he ‘wrong’ 
on this re equality moves aimed at level playing field s.t. have authentic ‘choice’ 
for Kantian liberalism/? …ditto re Rawls stuff p.68 etc and notion of Rawlsian 
‘equality’ actually about authentic ‘choice’ ?? …p69 re education as a primary 
good for Rawls and therefore essential for equality leading to authentic choice??] 
 
In summary, then, the fear is of education being captured by a pseudo-scientific 
discourse of economics23 and managerialism, at a cost yet to be ascertained but 
difficult to measure. 
 
The ideological motivations for this new educational model seem to be varied but 
rarely explicit.  At a macro-economic level one motivating factor was the 
international competitiveness of the New Zealand economy24, presumably both in 
terms of educational ‘outputs’ and of efficient resource allocation. The new 
framework would ideally produce a more efficient use of resources25 as high 
performers are rewarded and poor performers flounder. There is more than a whiff 
of the ‘commodification’ of education here – for example in the language of 
education ‘providers’, student ‘consumers’26, consumer ‘preferences’, educational 
‘outputs’ and ‘markets’ – though never made explicit, presumably  for fear of 
offending any lingering sensibilities with respect to education as a process of 
learning, innovation, aculturation, knowledge for its own sake, nurturing of 
creativity and critical analysis, and whatever else goes on behind those closed 
classroom doors. There are also practical problems – for example, in urban areas 
                                                 
21 In reality authentic choice was limited to certain parents, and in urban areas schools (and in particular the 
principals) were in fact doing the choosing (J.Boston ‘The unbalanced educational laboratory’ NZ Education 
Review, May 19 2000 at 11).  The new Labour government has introduced legislation to reintroduce a system of 
geographical zoning. 
22 See, for example, M.Olssen ‘Education Policy, the cold war and the ‘liberal-communitarian debate’ (1998) 13 
Journal of Education Policy 63 at 67. 
23 Note that similar fears have been expressed of the Law and Economics movement in legal jurisprudence – see, for 
example, M. Davies asking the law question (Law Book Company, 1994) at 128-141 
24   For example, a 1991 Ministry of Education statement that ‘national directions for schooling [are] essential if 
New Zealand is to achieve the standards which, as a small trading nation, it needs in order to prosper alongside other 
nations in the international market place’ (quoted in supra, note 4 at 15; see also supra note 6 at 122). 
25 The Picot Report (supra, note 3 at 9.7.1) estimates efficiency gains of ‘at least’ $111m. p.a. versus additional costs 
of $18m. p.a. (1987-88 $NZ).   
26 Note that this fundamental question of the ‘consumer’ of education is unclear – is it the student, the parents of 
students, employers, the government or is it indeed society itself? 
the abolition of school zones and the ability to attract foreign students render the 
definition of ‘community’ problematic even if it is taken to be the desired target 
audience or ‘consumer’. 
 
Another strong ideological theme, again not explicit but fairly obvious, is that of 
community and democracy – the notion that the education of children ought to be 
responsive to the values, needs, aspirations and so on of local community.  There 
are many theoretical problems here – for example, the contrary notion in liberal 
societies such as America that the individual (in this case the student) precedes and 
transcends community.  Similarly if liberalism suggests, or better yet demands, an 
equal starting point for individuals in their pursuit of the good life then the ability 
of ‘better’ schools to, for example, levy voluntary fees and attract students will 
continue to promote a hierarchy of schools.  Thus one version of liberalism27 
suggests that we need an interventionist state to distribute a reasonably equal 
entitlement to individuals in at least structuring a level playing field, for example 
through equal access to quality education.  An acitivist state is actually a necessary 
pre-condition for authentic liberty.  That version of course conflicts with present 
conceptions of a minimalist state.  Whatever philosophical forces might be 
motivating the new model seem to be confused if not contradictory. 
 
In summary the new regime is a combination of artificially induced market forces, 
state-sponsored regulation and monitoring and a ‘democratic’ model of community 
governance.  In its legislative embodiment the law can be seen as sword in cutting 
down the old model and shaping the new, motivated by a new ideology, and to a 
lesser extent as a shield against perceptions (real or imagined) of opportunism and 
inefficiency. 
 
Whether or not it has been a success is difficult to establish.  There is some 
evidence that fears of negative effects have proven justified in terms of increased 
polarisation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ schools and additional administrative 
workloads on staff, and further that there has not been any offsetting improvement 
in the quality of the education system28.  In any event I offer my own experience at 
the ‘coal face’ as a different and perhaps useful perspective. 
 
Micronarrative: A Personal Account 
 
                                                 
27 See, for example, M.Olssen ‘Restructuring New Zealand Education: Insights From the Work of Ruth Jonathan’ 
(1999) 34 New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies’ #1 54 at 58 – the term used here is ‘Ehtical’ or 
‘Perfectionist’ Liberalism. 
28 Forthcoming study by H.Ladd, E.Fiske When School’s Compete: A Cautionary Tale, quoted in the NZ Education 
Review, May 19 2000 at 5 – the authors concluded generally that ‘combining self-governance with competition 
appeared to exacerbate the polarisation of enrolment patterns by racial and ethnic groups, created winners and losers 




I put this personal experience forward in full awareness of the limitations of 
anecdotal accounts, but encouraged by postmodernists’ encouragement of 
individual ‘stories’ which can illuminate broader themes. 
 
It is important to emphasize that there is nothing extraordinary about the basic 
characteristics of this narrative.  The school was located in a high decile socio-
economic environment, staffed by a unexceptional group of teachers headed by a 
principal who was probably averagely competent and a school board comprising a 
reasonable cross section of the community and probably gifted with at least an 
average complement of common sense.  The central question to be answered is 
whether or not this ‘case study’ supports the underlying assumption of the new 
order – namely that the important variable in educational outcomes is the way in 





I was elected to a school board (which we can call ‘Stone School’) in 1998 and 
thence elected chairperson.  The process itself is of passing interest – I was 
encouraged by the principal and two of the teachers to run for election, 
notwithstanding my own reservations.  The motives of my promoters were quite 
different but in retrospect significant.  The principal perceived me as a more 
‘friendly’ trustee than those on the previous Board, and engineered my nomination 
to the chair.  The teachers were concerned at the principal’s management of the 
school and thought I would ‘stand up to him.’  As it turned out I probably 
disappointed all parties.  A final factor was that there was expected to be a shortage 
of candidates and I felt a twinge of civic duty that persuaded me to run.  In any 
event school ‘politics’ were clearly in motion even before the board election. 
 
All but one of the elected Board members were new.  Lack of continuity and 
experience were immediate problems.  Not surprisingly the principal was to be our 
guide as he was effectively the sole repository of relevant knowledge and 
experience.  One trustee, having narrowly missed election, was co-opted to fill a 
perceived gap in financial and accounting expertise.  All but myself were parents 
of pupils at the school.  There was some anecdotal history of the previous board 
not always ‘getting along’ with the principal.  There was also some ‘feeling’ in the 
community that, to the extent that the school was less than it could be, the blame 
lay substantially with the principal himself.  Not that he was extraordinarily 
incompetent but simply that he was not up to the expectations of the community.  
Of course it is impossible to separate out reasonably grounded suspicions from 
some inevitable low level current of dissatisfaction with an individual discharging 




That institutional innovations do not evolve precisely as expected is not a criticism, 
and ideally one starts on the new trajectory with the expectation of having to adapt 
and reshape roles as they reveal their strengths and weaknesses.  But whatever the 
ideological framework for the new model, and however the new roles were 
conceptualized, in practice the roles and relationships were in my experience 
fraught with practical difficulties and limitations of experience, expertise and 
resources within the board. 
 
A pattern of monthly meetings with an agenda largely engineered by the principal 
was quickly set.  The subject matter – approval of reports, authorisation of school 
trips, approval of draft standard practices in anticipation of an ERO audit – were 
largely uncontroversial.  If there was a fundamental shortcoming it was grounded 
in the complex, subtle and all-important relationship with the principal.  This was a 
board almost totally lacking in professional educational expertise, both as to 
educational theory and the day to day practices and processes of running a school.  
The vacuum was unsurprisingly filled by the principal, who was thereby able to 
largely ‘control’ the board with selectively presented information and self-serving 
responses which board members felt unable to challenge.  That helplessness came 
from two sources, the first being most obviously the board’s limited knowledge 
base.  The second constraint was I think the more important – the board was 
entirely reliant on the principal for the smooth running of the school, and 
extremely reluctant to confront the principal in any way that might prove divisive.  
A related constraint was the board’s ultimate inability to discipline or dismiss the 
principal, who had elected to continue his permanent status rather than move to (a 
more remunerative) contract status.  There was no suggestion of sufficient 
incompetence to warrant any kind of dismissal proceedings, especially given the 
risks29, so in effect he had tenure.  Given that we had to work together for the 
foreseeable future there was a strong incentive to keep the relationship 
harmonious, at almost any cost, and we did. 
 
A telling example was the appointment of a part-time deputy principal which 
became possible as the school’s relatively small enrolment briefly reached the 
necessary threshold for the appointment.  The principal had a handpicked 
candidate from the existing staff, asserted that this was the only possible candidate, 
and put the person forward for approval by the board.  I personally had 
reservations about the individual as a result of informal feedback from teachers.  
But none of the board members had any formal reason to object, and no informed 
grounds for questioning the process.  Nor did we even interview the candidate on, 
                                                 
29 See, for example, Hobday v Timaru Girls High School Board of Trustees (Employment Court, Christchurch 
E16/94) wherein a board dismissal of a principal was overturned and the reinstated principal awarded $62,000 and 
legal costs of $181,000. 
for example, his views on the school charter, his vision for the school, his practices 
for meeting the NEG’s, and so on. I was reluctant to challenge the appointment 
when it was so clearly the principal’s wish, and similarly did not wish to 
undermine an apparent consensus among other trustees.  But most importantly I 
believe we were all motivated by the desire to keep the relationship with the 
principal amicable.  The result was the permanent appointment of a deputy 
principal whom I had some grounds for believing might be unsuitable, via a 
process I wasn’t at all sure had integrity.  I would guess that the process, if not the 
outcome, would have been different under the old model. 
 
The respective roles of board and principal – theoretically governance and 
management respectively – were poorly understood30.  In a very real sense the 
board was ‘sucked into’ largely rubberstamping minor matters of management and 
the principal was able to assert substantial control over matters of governance, on 
the rare occasions they might arise.  The faceless bureaucrats of the previous 
Department of Education were now replaced by the all too familiar faces of local 
community, and the potential for ‘small’ politics unleashed in the local 
community. 
 
On the other hand there was an exception to the dominance of the principal in the 
bulk funding debate.  Bulk funding had been merely a background noise which I 
had picked up from chance newspaper articles. It will be recalled that the bulk 
funding of salaries was introduced on a voluntary basis and that only a minority of 
schools had opted for it.  The government introduce financial incentives totalling 
some $222 million to encourage schools to join, sometimes for considerable 
financial gain.  When I raised the question with the Board it was clear that there 
was very little understanding of the issues and considerable resistance from the 
principal and, it was said, staff (echoing union hostility).  I insisted that the issue 
be debated and at least accepted or rejected on informed grounds.  I invited a 
spokesperson to make a presentation, and there then evolved a fair measure of 
support not only on the board but even the principal, who saw the potential for 
flexibility in managing staffing at the school.  I left the Board before the issue was 
finally resolved, but it came to represent  to me what I took to be a paradigmatic 
example of the leadership on governance which the board was supposed to deliver 
but which we had been sadly lacking.  It was a question of striking a balance 
between the board asserting itself in the face of a dominant principal and at the 
same time protecting an harmonious relationship with the CEO upon whom it was 
so heavily reliant.  However, it was a balance rarely struck in my experience, and 
                                                 
30See, for example, New Zealand Law Society Seminar ‘Education Law’ (October 1999) at 17-20.  In fact  the 
board’s powers – on a plain reading of the Education Act 1989 – are very broad and include management. Section 
75 stipulates that (subject to other enactments and the general law of New Zealand) ‘…a school board has complete 
discretion to control the management of the school as it thinks fit’ [emphasis added].  Note as well that the board is 
the principal’s employer and the principal must therefore obey its lawful and reasonable directions.   
the reality was a weak board and the deliverance by default of an inappropriate 
measure of power to the principal. 
 
The ideology and institutional theory behind the new educational model were 
never raised in Stone School.  We on the board simply commenced in almost total 
ignorance of what our roles and functions were supposed to be – rather we took our 
cue from the principal and rarely forged a course of our own (with the above 
exception of bulk funding).  Clearly some kind of training was required, as our 
responsibilities included such areas as employment, enrolment, privacy, health and 
safety, curriculum and finance – clearly we were competent in few, if any.  The 
only avenue available lay in seminars and workshops conducted by the School 
Trustees Association.  They were voluntary and on the whole poorly attended 
though (in my limited experience) competently run.  In the board’s first year only 
one other trustee and myself attended an evening workshop.  In the course of the 
workshop it became embarrassingly clear at one point that we were not even aware 
of the NAG’s and NEG’s, fundamental as they were to the new model.  However, I 
soon understood at least some of the basic rules and familiarised myself with the 
NAG’s and NEG”s for the later introductory meeting for the school’s ERO audit.  
Thus was I able to give at least the illusion to the ERO ‘examiners’ that the board 
was more or less aware of the fundamentals. 
 
Although the board were the employer of teaching staff we had no direct 
communication – only secondhand input through the principal and staff 
representative.  Thus we had no insight into how the new model affected teaching 
staff – for example, the discussion above suggests that this is a ‘low trust’ model 
which diminishes values of professionalism and trust in favour of managerialism 
constant monitoring.  And of course that is the point – in the core business of 
teaching and learning the board was radically ill-equipped, ill-informed and 
irrelevant. 
 
A final reservation relates to the involvement of parents and community.  There 
was almost none.  At best we might insert a note in the school newsletter that the 
draft school charter was available for input but we held no public meetings or 





If the experience of Stone School can be applied more broadly then the implication 
may be that we will be burdened with decisions made inconsistently and often 
irrationally across schools depending on the machinations of local small politics, 
particularly in the principal-board relationship. With under-qualified, 
inexperienced and under-trained boards motivated primarily by fear of making 
(especially ERO) mistakes and heavily reliant on principals there is a high risk of 
‘board capture’ by principals.  That is the reverse of the intent of the legislation.  
Although the legal hazards are fairly benign – for example, responsibility for 
delivering on the school charter, with qualilty assurance provided by ERO31  –  
there are some risks32. 
 
Public choice theory suggests that those working in insitutions and organisations 
‘will necessarily and always serve their own interests (ahead, for example, of those 
of their students)33’ – in other words they will act not in the public interest but out 
of self-interest.  Indeed this was implicit in the new program, motivated as it was 
by mistrust of both the old Department of Education bureaucracy and the teachers’ 
unions.  Hence the need for ERO.  But the same theory must motivate principals in 
relations with boards of trustees, and that was my experience.  Of course the same 
logic applies to the board as well – they presumably share with the principal an 
urge for power, though more diffused and less focused, both because they are a 
collective and because it is a part-time activity for them and not a core business.  
The old model of ‘provider capture’34 – referring to capture by bureaucracy and 
teacher unions – is now replaced in Stone School by board capture by the 
principal.  A similar danger must exist for provider capture by a determined, issue-
oriented school board.  Thus, the new model simply moves the locus of struggle 
for power and assertion of self-interest to the local level where there is presumably 
a greater likelihood of aberrant outcomes as compared to a centralised system, 
whatever its faults.  In any event the new model is vulnerable to opportunism 
which is not only morally hazardous35 but also quite likely resource inefficient, if 
only because it is driven by non-professionals. 
 
My personal doubts about the new model, in light of both my experience on a 
Board and what ‘common sense’ surely suggests, can be narrowed down to one 
simple proposition – that it is naïve to assume that a Board of lay persons will 
somehow bring to their task a sufficient modicum of judgement, wisdom and 
professional expertise to govern and manage the complex task of education 
delivery optimally, or even better than the previous centralised model.  From my 
brief review of the literature there has been little analysis of the nature of boards of 
trustees – their backgrounds, values, motivations, modus operandi.  Rather it is just 
assumed that they will be adequately equipped, properly motivated and competent, 
                                                 
31 For example, the NEG’s, which are automatically incorporated into binding school charters, articulate a guiding 
principle that ‘the board of trustees accepts that all students in any school under its control are given an education 
which enhances their learning, builds on their needs and respects their dignity …this education shall challenge them 
to achieve personal standards of excellence and to reach their full potential …’.  Surely such exhortations, admirable 
though they may be, are too broad and unmeasurable to carry with them any meaningful legal liability (or 
alternatively that they are simply too onerous to discharge).  Note also that given reasonable opportunity the courts 
will be inclined to defer to board decisions – see, for example, Maddever v Umawera District School [1993] 2 
NZLR 478 at 506-7. 
32Particularly in the area of unjust dismissal – supra, note 28.   
33 P.Fitzsimons et al ‘Economics and the Educational Policy Process in New Zealand’ (1999) 34 New Zealand 
Journal of Educational Studies’ #1 35 at 42. 
34 Supra, note 6 at 128 
35 Ibid  
notwithstanding that there are essentially no qualifications stipulated and no 
training required.  It is essentially Big Politics writ small but with no expert 
executive (other than self-interested principals) to support elected representatives.  
One wonders. 
 
